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One recurring feature of Jacques Lacan’s teaching in the 1950s is a 
certain polemic against what he calls “the fundamental misunder-
standing brought about by the relation of understanding.”1 Taking 
aim primarily against the influence of Karl Jaspers and his phenom-
enologically informed psychopathology, Lacan calls understanding a 
“mere mirage,”2 a “nauseating category,”3 something constitutively 
“ungraspable;”4 he links understanding to a “vacuous personalism”5 
and a “liberal heart-to-heart.”6 As Lacan says in his essay on “The Di-
rection of Treatment…” the preface “’You understand…’ is an intro-
ductory phrase by which someone who has nothing to convey thinks 
he can impress someone who understands nothing.”7 While it is obvi-
ous that there is indeed something coercive in the use of this preface, 
“You understand…” a phrase which strong-arms one’s interlocutor 
into compliance with the terms and assumptions of the discussion, 
Lacan’s point is actually much more profound, attacking not only the 
conceit of the preface, “you understand…” but the very foundations 
upon which the possibility for understanding as such is built: that is, 
Lacan calls into question the very category of meaning. 
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Jaspers’ formulation of understanding does claim a pretense to 
the immediate comprehension of meaning. That is, understanding, as 
Jaspers himself defines it, is “the perception of meaning,”8 the appre-
hension of meaningful, or understandable, connections (Verständli-
che Zusammenhänge). According to Jaspers, understanding “grasps as 
self-evident how one psychic event emerges from another; how a man 
attacked should be angry, a betrayed lover jealous...»9 These are Jas-
pers’ quick and oft repeated examples: rage due to being attacked and 
jealously due to betrayal. He sees these as the most visceral kinds of 
affections and so therefore the most immediately understandable. Jas-
pers’ idea is that understanding implies a direct psychic connection 
between the self and the other. As he says, “understanding of meaning 
impinges on myself in the other and on what is closest to me in the 
other.»10 It is precisely because of the intimate psychic relationality 
made possible through understanding that Jaspers hinges the entire 
project of psychopathology on the faculty of understanding as the spe-
cial, characteristic mode of investigation in questions of the psyche as 
opposed to the questions of the other sciences. For Jaspers, «the ex-
pression ‹understanding› [is to be used] solely for the understanding 
of psychic events ‹from within›.” The expression will never be used 
for the appreciation of objective causal connections, which can only 
be seen ‹from without›.  “For these,” he says, “we shall reserve the 
expression ‹explanation.›”11  Whereas all other sciences depend upon 
the relation of “explaining” [erklären], Jaspers establishes psychopa-
thology on what he calls “the relation of understanding” [verstehen] as 
psychopathology’s privileged domain. It is through the special tool of 
understanding that one apprehends causal connection in the domain 
of psychopathology. 
According to Lacan, Jaspers’ position …
… consists in thinking that some things are self-evident, that, 
for example, when someone is sad it’s because he doesn’t have 
what his heart desires. [To this, Lacan retorts] Nothing could be 
more false. There are people who have all their heart desires and 
are still sad. Sadness is a passion of quite another color.12 
To relate to someone’s sadness as if one can understand it empathically, 
or, as Jaspers calls it “genetically,” is to resort to the realm of imaginary 
identifications through which one can simply imagine oneself in the 
place of the other, “walk a mile in their shoes,” as the saying goes, and 
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through this understand the other. For Lacan, this idea is patently 
false. He says: “Everything that in human behavior belongs to the 
psychological order is subject to such profound anomalies and con-
stantly presents such obvious paradoxes…”13 that the link between 
not having what one’s heart desires and sadness, or the link between 
betrayal and jealousy, or the link between being attacked and anger, is 
far from self-evident. Through Jaspers’ emphasis on “understanding 
meaningful connections” he covers over the most striking disparities 
in patterns of human experience, and in doing so he pretends to ex-
plain them while ignoring the key insights of Freud’s discovery alto-
gether. Lacan writes: 
If psychoanalysis teaches us anything, if psychoanalysis consti-
tutes a novelty, it’s precisely that the human being’s development 
is in no way directly deducible from the construction of, from the 
interferences between, from the composition of meanings.14  
In short, meaning is not made on the basis of direct causal connections. 
Lacan goes on to insist on this point with the following example:
When you give a child a smack, well! it’s understandable that he 
cries-without anybody’s reflecting that it’s not at all obligatory 
that he should cry. I remember a small boy who whenever he got 
a smack used to ask-Was that a pat or a slap? If he was told it was 
a slap he cried, that belonged to the conventions, to the rules of 
the moment, and if (he was told) it was a pat he was delighted.15
This example illustrates two basic and important points of Lacan’s 
thought: Firstly, it demonstrates the role of the signifier over the sig-
nified because it shows how the meaning of the smack is determined 
by the signifiers “pat” or “slap.” That is, even in an example from 
what is a direct and simple, physical gesture- that of a good smack- we 
find the predominance of the signifier over the signified and not the 
other way around. Secondly, if we think through the example a little 
further than does Lacan, the example also demonstrates Lacan’s point 
that “no signification can be sustained except by reference to another 
signification.”16 That is to say, if we imagine what actually happens in 
the situation when the child is compelled to ask, “Was that a pat or 
a slap?” depending on the context of the episode, several possibilities 
come to mind: the child might genuinely be asking for clarification 
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“was that a pat or a slap?” or the child might be trying to lighten the 
mood with a sense of humor, making a joke in order to avoid more 
punishment after what he very well knows was a slap, or (what seems 
to me a more sinister possibility) with this question, the child could 
be taunting the parent: “Come on, is that all you can do? Was that a 
pat or a slap?” The point is that the signification of the pat or the slap 
or even of the question itself is sustained only by reference to another 
signification, that is, to its context, to what it was that evoked the pat 
or the slap in the first place and to what the child offers up with this 
response. “In other words, signification comes about only on the basis 
of taking things as a whole.”17 As Lacan says:
When one gets a smack there are many other ways of responding 
than by crying. One can return it in kind, or else turn the other 
cheek, or one can also say– Hit me, but listen! A great variety of 
possibilities offer themselves, which are neglected in the notion 
of the relation of understanding as it’s spelled out by Jaspers.18 
 
But it is not simply that Jasper’s notion of the relation of understand-
ing fails to account for the multiplicity of possible responses that one 
can have to any given psychological event, it is rather more fundamen-
tally that Jaspers uses this notion of understanding to cover over what 
is precisely at issue and in question even in Jaspers’ own discipline, in 
that of psychopathology. 
Jaspers begs the question when he comes up against it: under-
standing can only explain what is already understandable on his terms. 
He writes: «Understanding by itself does not lead to any causal explana-
tion except in indirect fashion, when it happens to come up against the 
understandable.»19 Each causal connection made through the use of the 
understanding establishes a cause that always refers back to understand-
ing only that which is already understandable. Jaspers develops his own 
account of a hermeneutic circle in order to make this point, writing:
 We achieve understanding within a circular movement from 
particular facts to the whole that includes them and back again 
from the whole thus reached to the particular significant facts. 
The circle continually expands itself and tests and changes it-
self meaningfully in all its parts.  A final ‹terra firma› is never 
reached.  There is only the whole as it is attained at any time, 
which bears itself along in the mutual opposition of its parts.20
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What this particular way of thinking the hermeneutic circle does not 
account for is the radical difference to the whole that a part can make. 
That is, without an account of the discrepancies, gaps, and ruptures 
within a whole that the part can often indicate as a kind of hole within 
the whole, Jaspers’ understanding serves only as a plug, a corking up 
of the very ruptures, which psychoanalysis came into being in order to 
explain. That is, Lacan’s return to Freud is precisely a return to what 
he sees as a forgotten question in the various inheritances of Freud’s 
discovery, discourses born out of the fact that the neurotic symptom 
does not abide by the logic of understanding or any clear causal chain. 
It is for this reason that Lacan insists: “Don’t try to understand!” and 
“…leave this nauseating category to Karl Jaspers and his consorts.”21 
In response to this decree, I’d like to pose a few questions: What ex-
actly would it mean to leave the understanding behind? One finds 
oneself in the dilemma of even posing the question: How are we to 
understand, no, to think(?) the alternative to understanding? It seems 
to me that one of the biggest challenges to developing the philosoph-
ical implications of Lacan’s thought lies in responding to these ques-
tions and in situating his thought vis a vis the problem of understand-
ing. To this end, in what follows, I will parse three versions or aspects 
of Lacan’s critique of understanding. 
In the first and weakest version, Lacan’s critique of understanding is 
a warning against understanding too quickly and not against under-
standing all together. In Seminar III, Lacan advises “Begin by thinking 
you don’t understand. Start from the idea of a fundamental misun-
derstanding. This is an initial attitude, failing which there is really no 
reason why you should not understand anything and everything.”22 
Here, ultimately, one will be able to understand but the concern is 
really with understanding too quickly. Lacan is wary of the traps into 
which understanding can lead if one does not proceed slowly and with 
caution. We can find this version of the critique particularly in what 
Lacan says about the role of understanding in the training of analysts:
 
You will observe in the training we give to our students that this 
is always a good place to stop them. It’s always at the point where 
they have understood, where they have rushed in to fill the case 
with understanding, that they have missed the interpretation 
that it’s appropriate to make or not to make.23 
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The problem with understanding too quickly is that the analyst’s un-
derstanding gets in the way of her ability to hear what the analysand 
actually says.  Lacan explains:
This is naively expressed in the expression – This is what the subject 
meant – How do you know? What is certain is that he didn’t say 
it. And in most cases, on hearing what he did say, it appears that 
at the very least a question mark could have been raised which 
alone would have been sufficient for the valid interpretation, or 
at least the beginnings of it.24
In this first version of the critique of understanding, then, the main 
concern is the quality of the analyst’s attention. Understanding is a 
problem because it gets in the way of hearing. Lacan advocates for this 
kind of non-understanding hearing. Responding to Theodore Reik’s 
claim that analysts should listen to their patients intuitively, with a 
kind of “third ear,” Lacan scoffs:
 
But what need can an analyst have for an extra ear, when it some-
times seems that two are already too many […]  May one of your 
ears become as deaf as the other one must be acute. And that is 
the one that you should lend to listen for sounds and phonemes, 
words, locutions, and sentences, not forgetting pauses, scansions, 
cuts, periods, and parallelisms…25 
Lacan’s claim is that the understanding should be suspended in the 
case of analysis; that to achieve what Freud called the “free floating at-
tention” or the “Gleichschwebende,” one must be trained not in under-
standing but precisely in not understanding. The import of this first 
version then seems to be primarily clinical. As Bruce Fink puts it in his 
book Against Understanding: 
 
We need not affect analysands’ understanding or self-under-
standing to change how they experience the world, life, relation-
ships, and their own impulses26 […] Part of the analyst’s job is 
to take meaning apart, to undermine understanding by showing 
that far from explaining everything, it is always partial, not total, 
and leaves many things out.27 
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Ultimately this is a critique of understanding but it is not a ruthless 
critique of all understanding. That is, it leaves the possibility for un-
derstanding outside of the realm of clinical analysis, understanding in 
the realm of philosophy, or more specifically, in the ontological deter-
mination of understanding, wide open, and indeed even within analy-
sis it promises the possibility of understanding even if it is necessarily 
a limited understanding, an understanding deferred. 
The second version of the critique of understanding is a much stronger 
version than the first. It is that understanding “is evoked only as an 
ideal relation. As soon as one tries to get close to it, it becomes, prop-
erly speaking, ungraspable.»28 Here, Lacan suggests not only that we 
should not force an understanding too quickly, but that understanding 
never occurs in the way we think it does; that understanding is only 
ever imaginary. It really only covers over a certain gap. Lacan says: 
We always understand too much, especially in analysis. Most of 
the time, we’re fooling ourselves. […] And from the moment 
one doesn’t demand extreme conceptual rigor of oneself, one al-
ways finds some way to understand.29 
The work of understanding is thus a kind of covering over. We can 
only “understand” precisely where we do not. Understanding in this 
sense is merely a failure of rigor in the concept. 
In this second version of the critique of understanding we find a 
harbinger of what Lacan will articulate later on in Seminar XI as the 
gap in the function of cause. Just as we find understanding where our 
conceptual rigor has failed, where it has served to plug up a hole or 
a kind of gap, we find in the function of cause a certain gap. As La-
can says: “…there is cause only in something that doesn’t work.”30 
The discovery of the Freudian unconscious emphasized precisely the 
failure of the notion of cause with respect to psychological phenome-
na. Lacan explains that “the Freudian unconscious is situated at that 
point, where, between cause and that which it affects, there is always 
something wrong.”31 However, Lacan does not limit this discovery 
about the gap of cause to the domain of psychoanalysis. He goes on to 
explain that the problem holds true for the notion of cause as such, for 
the notion of causality in science and philosophy. He says:
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Whenever we speak of cause […] there is always something an-
ti-conceptual, something indefinite. The phases of the moon are 
the cause of tides– we know this from experience, we know that 
the word cause is correctly used here. Or again, miasmas are the 
cause of fever– that doesn’t mean anything either, there is a hole, 
and something that oscillates in the interval.32
In short, Lacan’s claim is that the notion of causality in itself is not 
sufficient to explain the relation of cause and effect, that it often cov-
ers over precisely what is in question. 
Cause is a concept that, in the last resort, is unanalysable - im-
possible to understand by reason – if indeed the rule of reason, 
the Vernunftsregel, is always some Vergleichung, or equivalent– and 
that there remains essentially in the function of cause a certain 
gap.33  
Lacan’s discussion of the gap within the notion of cause is indexed 
to Kant’s Attempt to Introduce Negative Magnitudes into Philosophy. In 
this pre-critical text, Kant was responding to debates surrounding the 
skepticism of David Hume in which Hume raised similar concerns 
about the notion of causality. In Negative Magnitudes, Kant attempts 
to respond to Hume and to explain specifically “how one thing issues 
from another.” Kant poses the problem like this: 
I fully understand how a consequence is posited by a ground in 
accordance with the rule of identity; analysis of the concepts 
shows that the consequence is contained in the ground […] But 
what I would dearly like to have explained to me, however, is 
how one thing issues from another thing, though not by means 
of the law of identity.34 
Kant’s solution to this problem involves the introduction of the con-
cept of negative magnitude, which introduces a principle of what Kant 
calls “real opposition.” The basic idea is that we can articulate the 
relation of things by identifying their opposing forces so that the caus-
al power of anything names the degree to which it is the ground for 
some effect or influence on something else.35  For Kant the concept 
of a negative magnitude provides an explanation for causal connec-
tion because it provides a framework for thinking the relation of force 
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between things by defining them in terms of their effects upon each 
other. Kant goes through a host of examples, explaining how debt is 
merely negative profit, falling is just negative rising, and pain is nega-
tive pleasure. In each case, identifying the negative magnitude of one 
thing in relation to another allows for an explanation of a causal re-
lation. However, in Lacan’s reading of this text Kant’s solution does 
not succeed in identifying an explanation for the notion of cause at 
all. Lacan says,
we can see how closely Kant comes to understanding the gap 
that the function of cause has always presented to any conceptu-
al apprehension[…] For cause - any modality, even if Kant in-
scribes it in the categories of pure reason – to be more precise, 
he inscribes it in the table of relations, between inherence and 
community - cause is not any more the rationalized for this.36 
Similarly, what is in question with the function of understanding is a 
kind of gap within conceptual apprehension. In understanding, as in 
cause, there remains a certain relation to a rupture in the attempt to 
either cover over or to plug up a certain gap in conceptual apprehen-
sion. In short, the point of the second aspect of Lacan’s critique of 
understanding is that it has the tendency to cover over precisely what 
is in question. 
The third version of this critique takes aim against a notion of under-
standing as a relation to the whole. In the French, understanding is 
comprende, so we might note that it carries the sense of a comprehen-
sion, an apprehension of the whole. Whereas understanding aims to 
give us the whole, that is the hole with a w, the truth as revealed by 
psychoanalysis depends on the hole without it, the ruptures, splits, 
and breaks as revealed by the structures of the unconscious. Lacan 
emphasizes the fact that the subject is always already constituted by 
an understanding of her world, and her place in it. It’s just that under-
standing is precisely this constitution that is to be called into question 
in the context of an analysis. As Lacan says in the very beginning of 
Seminar I, what is involved in analysis is a reading of how the subject 
represents “…what is in himself? no, not only of himself -of himself 
and of everything else, that is to say of the whole of his system.”37 It’s 
not that Lacan is without a certain conception of the whole, but for 
Lacan, the whole can only be thought from the place where it is split. 
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In technical terms, it is split between the dimension of the imaginary 
and that of the symbolic, the name he gives to this is “the Real”.  
It is clear that understanding is always within the realm of the 
imaginary. The point is that, as Fink puts it: 
Working in the imaginary register […] involves trying to un-
derstand other people as if they were just like myself, as if they 
thought the same way, or felt the same way about things, as I 
do. The imaginary involves looking at others and seeing myself, 
believing that others have the same motives, hang-ups, and anx-
ieties I have.38 
This is precisely the notion of understanding that we get with Jaspers, 
for whom understanding meaning is what “…impinges on myself in 
the other and on what is closest to me in the other.»39 What under-
standing does is reduce what is foreign to what is familiar. This oper-
ation takes place in the realm of the imaginary because it takes place 
as a confirmation to given mental schema, a kind of imaging that pre-
forms any given encounter. At this level, Lacan insists that the analyst 
cannot remain at the level of the imaginary but must emphasize the 
dimension of the Symbolic. The symbolic “is beyond all understand-
ing, [and it is that] which all understanding is inserted into.”40  While 
the Imaginary is centered on understanding meaning, the symbolic 
is centered on non-meaning and non-sense. The imaginary allows a 
certain image of the whole but the symbolic draws our attention to 
the holes within it. And it is for this reason that Lacan emphasizes 
the importance of listening to the words over and above the meaning 
of an analysand’s discourse. In this third version, Lacan’s critique of 
understanding illuminates the distinction between the imaginary and 
the symbolic and reminds us to attend to the hole within the whole. 
To resist the desire to understand, the analyst must in some sense 
position the other who is the analysand, as one with whom the analyst 
stands related, not as the same as the analyst but instead as radically 
other. The presupposition of the analyst is that one can never be the 
same as the other precisely because one is never one – one is never 
same with oneself. This is perhaps what is offered by Lacanian theory 
in place of understanding, it is the truth of analysis. What I have sug-
gested here is that it is precisely this dissonance, the ring of being not 
the same with oneself, for which Lacan’s psychoanalytic discourse is 
calling us to listen. In other words, the analyst does not listen to the 
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other but listens instead to It… Lacan writes in his essay on “The 
Freudian Thing”:
It speaks [this is “the key to Freud’s discovery” and IT speaks 
precisely where it was least expected] namely, where it suffers.  If 
there ever was a time when, to respond to it, it sufficed to listen 
to what IT was saying (for the answer is already there in hearing 
it), [… ] Let us thus calmly return and spell out with the truth 
what it said of itself. The truth said, “I speak.”41
And when it does speak, I hope to have shown, we precisely do not 
understand. Or rather, when we are struck by the truth, we can only 
really ask: was that a pat or a slap?
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